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1. Introduction 
In spite of the widely publicised bucolic image of Heidi, milk and chocolate fitting international 
isolationism, Switzerland currently is a highly urbanised and globalised country. During the last 
three decades of the 20th century, the process of metropolization has profoundly altered the major 
elements of urban centrality (see Bassand 2001; Cunha and Schuler 2001). Internally, this 
process has led to the emergence of five functionally integrated metropolitan areas (Zurich, 
Basel, Geneva-Lausanne, Bern and the Insubrica Region), as well to the establishment of a 
hierarchy between these five large poles, with Zurich, Geneva-Lausanne and Basel being the top 
three. Externally, the metropolization process involves an increasing connectedness to a global 
order of urban networks, as well as the internationalisation of economic, social and cultural 
relations. It is via its metropolitan poles that the Swiss economy is linked to the global economy. 
This connectivity to global markets is seen as a major element of competitiveness of the Swiss 
economy: not only the industrial sector (e.g. engineering, tool machines, etc.), but also the 
service sector (e.g. financial services, insurances, etc.) heavily depend on international trade, 
with the main partners being located in EU countries.  
However, Switzerland is currently neither a member of the European Union, nor has it joined the 
European Economic Area treaty that regulates the relationships between the EU and other 
European non-EU countries (such as Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland). Instead, the 
relationships between Switzerland and the EU are based on painstakingly negotiated bilateral 
agreements with all the 15 (and nowadays 25) EU countries. This makes things rather difficult, 
but given the success of the national conservative Schweizerische Volkspartei in the 2003 
national election, there is reason to believe that the current status of Switzerland with respect to 
the EU will not change significantly in the decades to come. Hence, it becomes clear that 
Switzerland’s staying apart from the EU is a major obstacle for economic welfare. As a reaction 
to this awkward situation of economic internationalisation and political isolation, public 
authorities at all state levels – especially cities and cantons – are increasingly engaged in 
marketing their assets on a European and even global scale.  
This is also, and maybe especially, true for the city of Zurich. Solidly installed on the top of the 
national urban hierarchy, Zurich is the largest city of Switzerland and its undisputed economic 
powerhouse. As elsewhere in OECD countries, the local economy is now predominantly based 
on the service sector. Financial services (banking, insurance, etc.) already played an important 
role at the beginning of the 20th century and they have become predominant today. Economically 
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speaking, Zurich today is mainly a centre of (financial) services and, as such, heavily dependent 
on access to international markets. Similar to other cities, the city of Zurich is striving to 
maintain or improve its global market position. Most of these strategies are oriented at improving 
local conditions in order to make the city more attractive for the actors of the international 
marketplace. Such strategies include, for instance, the improvement of the transport 
infrastructure (e.g. via connection to high-speed railroad networks, airport), or the attractiveness 
of the labour force (e.g. via higher education), but also towards improving its traditional 
protestant image as rather boring place where nothing is ‘on’ (e.g. via cultural policy and event-
marketing). According to the outline defined in the CITTA project, this paper does not focus on 
such locally-oriented attractiveness strategies, but on internationally-oriented strategies, namely 
the city’s international activities, i.e. activities by which the city government aims at establishing 
direct links with institutions or organisations at the international level. 
More precisely, the main objective of our case study within the CITTA network is to examine 
the international activities of the city of Zurich and possible changes of these activities over time. 
There will be a special focus on the question if changes in Zurich’s international activities can be 
seen as a compensatory strategy for Switzerland’s isolation within the EU. This implies a 
twofold ‘problématique’: On the one hand Zurich’s international activities and possible changes 
over time have to be determined in a first step. In order to do this, we propose to look at four 
different international activities: big events, city partnerships and networks, economic 
promotion, as well as representation of the city on an international level. The aim here is to find 
out, whether Zurich’s various international activities can be seen as part of a coherent strategy 
(section 2). 
On the other hand we will investigate possible independent variables, which could explain the 
changes in the city’s international activities over time (section 3). In order to do so, we will focus 
on the staying apart of Switzerland from the EU and the problems for the city of Zurich resulting 
from the combination of political isolationism and economic internationalisation. We will argue 
that the economic performance of Zurich’s economy in the 1990s is connected to the Swiss 
absence from the EEA-treaty and that this has influenced the international strategy of the city 
towards a more materialistic orientation. 
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2. The city’s international activities  
In the introduction, we have suggested to define a city’s international activities as activities by 
which the city government aims at establishing direct links with institutions or organisations at 
the international level. In this section of our paper, we will describe these international activities 
for the case of Zurich, try to establish whether they are part of a coherent strategy, and examine 
whether change has taken place over time. Following Savitch and Kantor’s (2002) distinction, 
the question will be if the international strategy is nowadays more market-centred than social-
centred or vice versa. 
More precisely, we will do so by focusing on four types of activities. First, we will look at 
attempts to bring to Zurich big events that flow from organisations with an international scope. 
Second, we will close up on city partnerships and, third, on international city networks and their 
development over time. Fourth, we investigate into the economic promotion of both the city and 
the region of Zurich. Fifth, we will mention the issue of the city’s representation at the 
international level by the government and especially by the mayor.  
2.1 Big international events  
Two big international events are or were planned to be held in Zurich: The Olympic Winter 
Games 2014 and the European Football Championship 2008. In both cases, attempts failed or are 
failing. 
In the first case the Swiss Olympic Committee decided to withdraw the candidacy for the 2014 
Olympic summer games to be held in Zurich. The main reason for this was the insufficient 
political support of the canton and especially of the city of Zurich. As the city government was 
not ready to make any financial commitments concerning the Olympic Games, it decided to not 
support the candidacy. Another point was the missing public support for hosting the Olympic 
Games, with the public discussion focussing mainly on environmental problems (traffic, new 
stadiums) implied with the organisation by the Games.  
The case of the European Football Championship 2008 is different. It will be held jointly by 
Switzerland and Austria, the question here is whether some of the matches will take place in 
Zurich or not. The city government was very much in favour of it. However, due to currently 
insufficient infrastructure, the Hardturm-stadium needed to be rebuilt. As the new stadium 
would have been completely financed by private investors (mainly by the Credit Suisse bank) 
there was no financial risk involved for the public. The project included a large shopping mall 
within the stadium that would return investments. Public discussions about this project focused 
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mainly on environmental aspects. Particularly, neighbours and environmental groups feared that 
the shopping mall would lead to an increase of private traffic. The city government planned a 
restrictive use of parking spaces and an additional tramway to increase the share of public 
transport for people using the stadium infrastructure. Nevertheless, neighbourhood committees 
and an environmental group (Verkehrsclub der Schweiz) were against the project and asked for 
review by court (Verbandsbeschwerde). A cantonal court accepted the planned project, although 
it reduced the number of private traffic allowed. Neighbourhood groups did not accept this 
judgement and called on the national court. Because of a short time limit for building the new 
stadium (as it had to be ready for the Euro Championship 2008), the project was finally 
abandoned. After this decision an emotional public discussion began whether it was right that 
such a project could be stopped by an environmental group together with a bunch of self-
interested neighbours. Two groups were confronting each other, the ones in favour of the project 
with an economic interest and those against the project because of environmental reasons.  
The strategy of the city government that can be seen in these two projects can be analysed as a 
mixture of economic and social interests. The city government was not willing to risk 
investments in a project that was against the public opinion (Olympic Games). But it was well in 
favour of a private project that had a clear economic background and was not completely against 
public interests (building a new stadium for the Euro Championship 2008). Environmental 
groups had the chance to delay the latter and thus have it abandoned, leading to a harsh reaction 
of the city government, saying that these environmental groups ‘prohibit the economic 
development of Zurich’. So the city government clearly followed a market-centred strategy but 
failed with it because of a social-centred counter-strategy by environmental actors.  
2.2 City partnerships  
2.2.1 Kunming  
The city partnership between Zurich and Kunming (Peoples’ Republic of China) began in 19821. 
At the beginning the partnership primarily served the purpose of cultural exchange between the 
two cities but soon “spilled over” into more technical dimensions. Experts of the city of Zurich 
shared their knowledge in water supply, public transport, spatial planning, and monumental 
protection policies. The whole partnership was clearly oriented towards development and 
technical cooperation and did, at least at the beginning, not cover any economic activities. 
                                                 
1 Information can be found at the presidential department for the city of Zurich. Online: 
http://www3.stzh.ch/internet/fste/home/aussenbez_top/kunming.html. 
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In the Kunming partnership, the city of Zurich works together with the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology of Zurich (ETH: Eidgenössisch Technische Hochschule) and the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (DEZA: Direktion für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit). Both of 
these partners are financed completely by the Swiss federal state. The cooperation with the ETH 
is only for information exchange, because the ETH has its own development projects in 
Kunming. The DEZA covers part of the project costs having a special interest in the 
dissemination of knowledge to other plans, in the context of the project to build a rapid-transit 
railway similar to the one in Zurich.  
Right-wing parties oppose the partnership with Kunming since 1999 when the city parliament 
realized that the partnership was missing a legal basis and that the parliament had never 
approved a credit for the partnership. The reason for this was that the city government split the 
credit up so that the city parliament could not vote on it. This called heavy opposition mostly 
from the isolationist SVP. The criticism focussed on two points: On the one hand, it was aimed 
at the intervention of the city of Zurich in a field of foreign policy. It was argued that the city 
should not spend money in a policy field belonging to the federal level. This led to a reduction of 
the credit for the partnership for the years 2000 to 2002 from the requested 2.4 to 1.3 million 
Swiss francs. On the other hand, it was criticised that the project missed any specific gains for 
Zurich. Opponents suspected the project to be a “possibility for cheap travel for members of city 
government and their civil servants”. In reaction to these criticisms, the city government tried to 
change the focus of the partnership, emphasising the economic gains flowing from it. The 
cooperation was more and more used to provide Zurich’s companies with possibilities to contract 
business with Kunming officials. Especially in the case of public transport, the city of Kunming 
plans to spend 1.7 billion dollars and Zurich based engineering companies (such as ABB and 
Sulzer) are interested in participating. In a recent press release, the mayor’s office declared that 
the city partnership should be more focussed on providing a basis for Zurich’s business interests. 
The partnership is nowadays seen as a possibility to set a foot in the Chinese market and to 
promote Zurich as a tourist location2. 
The climax of the debate was reached when the SVP successfully launched a referendum against 
the project credit for the years 2000 to 2002. But the referendum was rejected in a clear 2:1 
majority. Notwithstanding, the city decided that the technical cooperation between Zurich and 
                                                 
2 The press release can be found at http://www3.stzh.ch/internet/mm/home/mm_04/09_04/mm_44.html. More 
information about the economic orientation can be found at 
http://www3.stzh.ch/internet/mm/home/mm_04/09_04/mm_44.ParagraphContainerList.ParagraphContainer0.Paragr
aphList.0010.File.pdf/040928_Zukunft%20Kunming.pdf. 
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Kunming should come to an end in 2004, while the cooperation on cultural issues should be 
continued. Information exchange will continue as well, at least as long as the financial 
consequences for the city of Zurich are modest. Hence, these recent changes in the underlying 
rationale of Zurich’s partnership with Kunming, there can be seen a shift from a rather social-
oriented to a mixed strategy (market- and social-oriented). In fact, the partnership will more or 
less come to an end now and the missing market-orientation can partly explain the downturn of 
the project. 
2.2.2 San Francisco  
The relatively new partnership with the city of San Francisco was a private initiative by Swiss 
Re, the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, the ETH and the University of Zurich and 
started in summer 20033. Although the initiative came from the private sector and most of the 
Zurich committee members are from the private sector, the city government decided to join and 
help building up this initiative. Nevertheless, the city government decided after the problems 
with the Kunming-partnership not to provide any financial support to the initiative.  
There are two main objectives of this partnership: know-how transfer for global companies and 
cooperation between scientific institutions4. Interestingly, in a press release of the city 
government, one of the reasons given for the initiative was the absence of Switzerland in the EU. 
So it seems that this partnership was created as a reaction to the isolationist Swiss foreign policy, 
trying to adjust problems for the city of Zurich. But in spite of a widely publicised ceremony 
where the mayors of the two cities gloriously signed the initiative, there has not been significant 
activity under the San Francisco – Zurich initiative up to now. Nevertheless, a start was made in 
late 2004, when a visit in San Francisco by a group of Zurich high school students was organised 
under the auspices of the initiative.  
Because of the problems with Kunming, the cooperation with San Francisco was explicitly only 
named an “initiative” but not a city partnership. Although this project should be financed without 
public money, this promise has already been one questioned by a member of the city parliament. 
The relatively new initiative with San Francisco has a clear materialistic focus and stresses the 
cooperation between private actors. There are no social elements visible up to now within this 
initiative.  
                                                 
3 Information can be found either at the presidential department for the city of Zurich (Online: 
http://www3.stzh.ch/internet/fste/home/aussenbez_top/san_francisco.html) or directly at the San Francisco – Zurich 
partnership (Online: http://www.sfzhinitiative.com). 
4 Other aspects which are mentioned for the cooperation are culture, communications, sports and tourism. 
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2.3 International city networks  
2.3.1 METREX (The network of European Regions and Arenas) 
The METREX network was founded in 1996, when representatives of approximately 120 
metropolitan regions and areas of Europe met at the Metropolitan Regions Conference in 
Glasgow. From the beginning, the EU played an important and (financially) supportive role. Up 
to now, 57 cities became full members of the METREX network, and a lot of other cities are 
somehow linked with it. One of them is Zurich (see below).  
The network is explicitly addressed to metropolitan regions and deals with their strategic 
problems. It lays a special focus on the spatial planning and development dimensions of 
metropolitan regions and has the purpose to provide a forum for the exchange of information for 
the member cities. The METREX-network and especially the InterMETREX project have the 
aim “to assist more European metropolitan regions and areas to realise their social, economic and 
environmental potential, through effective metropolitan spatial planning and development and 
thus to contribute to the better urban balance sought by the European frameworks” (Metrex 
2000: 12). It also explicitly mentions the coordinating function between the EU and the 
metropolitan regions, because the METREX network can speak with one voice, which allows the 
participating cities to affect policy decisions within the EU in spatial planning concerning 
metropolitan areas.  
Zurich was participating in the METREX program from the beginning, although rather 
incidentally. The head of the Greater Zurich Regional Planning Association (RZU: 
Regionalplanung Zürich und Umgebung) was invited to the funding congress of the METREX 
network in Glasgow to present the case of Zurich. Since then, the RZU participates regularly in 
METREX’ activities but never became a full member. This has been primarily due to financial 
reasons. As a planning association with a limited budget, the RZU is under financial pressure and 
the membership fee seems to be the main hurdle to become a full METREX member. Anyhow, 
as the head of the RZU mentioned in the interview, Zurich might become a full member of the 
METREX network in the near future. Therefore and up to now the cooperation of Zurich in the 
METREX network can be described as taking a free rider-position, because the cooperation is 
said to be very helpful for Zurich but there is no financial contribution to the network up to now. 
It has to be said though that the RZU is investing time to prepare presentations at the METREX 
meetings and that this engagement is also valuable for the other metropolitan regions. 
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The main participation of Zurich is in the InterMETREX project, which is one of three larger 
projects of the METREX network (beside the SocioMETREX and the PolyMETREX project). 
The objective of this InterMETREX project is “to assist more European metropolitan regions and 
areas to realise their social, economic and environmental potential, through effective 
metropolitan spatial planning and development and thus to contribute to the better urban balance 
sought by the European frameworks” (EuroMETREX report 2000). It is financed partially by the 
Interreg III program of the EU, but Zurich cannot profit from these funds because they are open 
only to cities of EU member states. The cooperation with METREX is not directly with the city 
of Zurich but with the Greater Zurich Regional Planning Association (RZU), which includes the 
six spatial, planning regions with and around the city of Zurich, all in all 69 communes5 and the 
canton of Zurich. So the RZU can be described as two-level cooperation between communes and 
the canton of Zurich. 
Zurich’s goal of the participation in the InterMETREX-project is to get an overview of 
comparable metropolitan regions in Europe and to learn from their experiences in spatial 
planning. The Swiss government financially supports the cooperation so it can be described as 
both international (involving the metropolitan regions in the METREX network) and national 
(involving the different federal levels within Switzerland, as communes, the canton and the 
federal level are involved in the cooperation with the METREX network).  
So although the cooperation within METREX is relatively new and has a social orientation, 
Zurich never became a full member of the network mainly because of financial reasons. The 
cooperation was initiated on the department level and city government was involved only once 
(approving the credit) and city parliament not at all involved (because the credit was too small). 
The cooperation of Zurich within this network is relatively limited but allows Zurich to hold 
contact with an EU-programme at least in one policy-area (spatial planning). 
2.3.2 ICLEI (International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives) 
ICLEI is a worldwide network of municipalities that engage for sustainable development. The 
association helps local governments to achieve improvements in sustainability through 
cumulative local action and helps them by providing evaluative tools, technical assistance and 
training6. Its aim is to “increase local governments’ capacity to address global challenges” 
(ICLEI 1990). It explicitly mentions its role to increase the understanding for local 
environmental problems before national and international bodies and can therefore be described 
                                                 
5 Information can be found at the RZU. Online: www.rzu.ch. 
6 See ICLEI. Online: www.iclei.org and www.iclei-europe.org.  
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as an international network7. National and regional bodies can join the ICLEI but cannot reach 
full membership as voting power is only permitted to municipal members. 
ICLEI was founded in 1990 at the World Congress of Local Governments for a Sustainable 
Future and has currently more than 450 members worldwide and about 190 in Europe, but only 
two of them are Swiss: Geneva and Zurich. Zurich joined the ICLEI in 1993 by a vote of the city 
government, which decided in response to the problems mentioned in the Agenda21 to 
participate in this network8. Although it were nation states who negotiated the Agenda21, cities 
seem most impaired by the problems of the Agenda21 and this was one reason why Zurich 
decided to join the network, or as one interview partner mentioned “Think global, act local”. 
The membership of Zurich in this network is rather passive. Three objectives of the membership 
were mentioned: members of the administration and political representatives go to conferences, 
the network is ideal for exchanging information worldwide, thereby providing the city of Zurich 
with ideas for solutions from other cities and the network participates in different projects (see 
below). The ICLEI has compared the case of Zurich in transport policy (see 
http://www.iclei.org/LEICOMM/LEI-052.HTM) with other European cities and comes to the 
conclusion that “Zurich constitutes an example of one of the most elaborate policies of urban 
mobility control”. In a bigger project ICLEI worked together with the department for 
environmental protection of the city of Zurich under the ICLEI Eco-Procurement Programme. 
The aim of this programme was to make procurement programmes of municipalities more 
ecologically efficient. For this purpose six cities (one of them Zurich) were closely examined 
about the current and potential ecological efficiency of their procurement programmes. This 
programme was financed by the ICLEI and the EU (RELIEF-project) but has been accomplished 
by the ICLEI in cooperation with the department for environmental protection of the city of 
Zurich. 
Zurich could profit in two ways from this programme. Firstly it got a valuable comparison with 
other European cities getting to know their problems and solutions. Secondly it was possible for 
the ICLEI to provide guidelines where improvements are easiest possible for Zurich. Although 
the original initiative for the procurement programme came from the canton of Zurich, it was the 
                                                 
7 Although it does not explicitly exclude the membership possibility of regions, but there can be no region found 
being a member in the Europe members list. Sometimes associations of local governments are members of the 
ICLEI as e.g. the Norwegian Association of Local Authorities. 
8 Information about the membership of Zurich is mostly gained from an interview with Dr. Karl Tschanz, head of 
the department of environmental protection of the city of Zurich. 
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city (and especially the department for environmental protection) that coordinated the activities 
with the ICLEI. 
There is no cooperation between the two Swiss member cities within the ICLEI network. The 
contacts between the cities in different nations are directly organized; there is no coordination 
neither between Geneva and Zurich nor with any national coordination body within the ICLEI 
network. Nevertheless, Zurich’s involvement in the ICLEI-network can be described as 
international networking. The initiative to participate in this network came from the city’s 
bureaucracy, the city government was only once (signing the credit) and city parliament not at all 
involved (because the credit was too small). Zurich’s commitment to this clearly ecologically 
oriented network is relatively small. 
2.3.3 ECDP (European Cities on Drug Policy) 
In 1990, representatives of the cities of Amsterdam, Zurich, Hamburg and Frankfurt gathered 
together to sign the so-called Frankfurt resolution. In this document, the four cities expressed 
their views about drug policy and they concluded that the “present system of criminally 
prohibiting the use of certain drugs has failed” (ECDP 1990). Instead of the system of repression 
they recommend that the possession of small quantities of drugs should not be punished, and that 
the purchase, possession and consumption of cannabis should be legalized. Until 1992 20 cities 
in eight countries have put their names under the Frankfurt resolution9, including four Swiss 
cities: Zurich, Basel, Berne and Lucerne. In 1992 all the member cities of the Frankfurt 
resolution decided to set up a formal structure to organize conferences and increase information 
exchange between them. This gave birth to the ECDP10. Shortly after, fifty-eight cities from 
fourteen countries held a conference and thirty-four of these cities joined the ECDP. The 
network is open for other international and national organizations (as e.g. the European Drugs 
Monitoring Centre, which joined the ECDP).  
The role of Zurich as an initial member has always been a very active one. The city government, 
which decided to join the ECDP, could profit from a broad coalition for their model in drug 
policy over all parties since 1993/94. This policy later became famous as the so-called “four-
pillar-policy”, which relies on prevention, therapy, harm reduction and repression. Zurich, as the 
Swiss city that suffered most from drug-related nuisances, has always been in favour of a liberal 
drug policy. At the beginning of the 1990s this position contradicted with the drug policy of the 
                                                 
9 In Italy three of the four members are actually provinces and not cities. 
10 Information about ECDP can be found at http://www.geocities.com/Hollywood/4198/lsd3.txt. The homepage of 
the ECDP itself (www.ecdp.net) is not active anymore. Further information was gained by an telephone interview 
with Michael Herzig, drug delegate of the city of Zurich. 
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Swiss federal government. The ECDP network was used to express the position of liberal cities 
Europe-wide against their regional and national governments that were still following a 
restrictive drug policy.  
Another purpose of the network was information exchange between the cities. Zurich has tested 
new solutions for the drug problem e.g. heroin prescription or methadone programmes which 
were introduced in 1993. Zurich was therefore able to share its experience with other cities that 
tried to follow a similar drug policy.  
The drug delegate of the city of Zurich was a long-time executive committee member of the 
ECDP. He could though not prevent that the network activities came to an end in 1999. The 
network is only not completely dissolved because of formal reasons. The reason for the inactivity 
is that most European countries have adopted the drug policies the ECDP stands for. So the role 
as a lobby organisation was not needed anymore. Anyhow, the cities still stay in contact for 
information exchange on their different programmes. These contacts are nowadays only bilateral 
and in the opinion of the drug delegate of Zurich, the ECDP network will not be reactivated in 
the near future11. In Switzerland more or less all larger cities have adopted the drug policy 
developed by Zurich and also the federal government is in favour of the “four-pillar-policy”. The 
opposition between the city of Zurich and the canton or between the city of Zurich and the 
federal level, which was a main reason to help building up the ECDP network, has changed in 
the second half of the 1990s, and given way to a cooperation between the different territorial 
levels. As a lobby organisation for the city in the face of the cantonal or the federal level, the 
ECDP has thus become obsolete.  
The ECDP-network has been a social-centred cooperation where Zurich has played a very active 
role, at least concerning the engagement of some bureaucrats but not financially. The city 
government’s involvement has been very low (only one decision for the credit) and the 
cooperation came to an end in 1999 and there has not been any equivalent commitment in the 
field of drug policy since then.  
2.3.4 Climate Alliance 
The Climate Alliance was founded in 1990 with the aim to form a network between European 
communes and communes from the Amazon region12. European communes that are a member of 
the network are aiming for quantitative reductions of the environmental impact in their cities 
                                                 
11 A meeting of all the members of the ECDP would be necessary to dissolve it which seems impossible to organize 
at the moment. 
12 See Climate Alliance. Online: http://www.klimabuendnis.org. 
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(reduction of CO2-emmissions by 50% until 2010) and are supporting indigenous communities 
in preserving the rain forest. Only communes with over 5’000 inhabitants can become full 
members. Smaller communes, regions and NGOs can become associate members13. The 
membership fee is proportional to the number of the city inhabitants. Currently, 13 Swiss cities 
are members of the Climate Alliance, the canton of Basel-Land and the NGO Incomindios are 
associated members14, Swiss communes are heavily underrepresented in this network, as e.g. 
there are 446 Austrian member commune.  
The original Swiss initiative to participate in the Climate Alliance came from the city of 
Lucerne, where the head of the department for environmental protection (Fachstelle für 
Umweltschutz) formed a Swiss section of the Climate Alliance (KBBS: Klimabündnis-Städte 
Schweiz) (Behringer 2003: 25).  
In this KBSS another ten Swiss cities are members that do not participate in the international 
Climate Alliance. The reason for this could be the necessity of a parliamentary vote to join the 
Climate Alliance and some municipalities are “not wished to participate in international unions” 
as this is an aspect traditionally being in the competency of the federal level (Behringer 2003: 
26). 
Zurich joined the KBSS in 1993 with a vote of the city government in recognition of the 
conference of Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Like the membership in the ICLEI-network (see above), 
the idea was that cities should do more than just follow the guidelines from the federal state and 
should instead take part in the international dialogue about climate change with their own 
opinion. From the two mentioned goals of the Climate Alliance the focus is laid more on the 
reduction of CO2-emmissions. But here too, the cooperation within the network is said to be “a 
rather loose cooperation of information exchange”, as one interview partner described it. The 
role of Zurich in this network has to be described as rather passive, especially concerning the 
interaction with cities abroad or with the European office in Frankfurt. Intensification across 
borders within the Climate Alliance is not intended at the moment.  
                                                 
13 See Satzung des Klimabündnisses. Online: http://www.klimabuendnis.org/download/satzung_2002_d.pdf. 
14 See Membership List of the Climate Alliance. The Swiss cities which are members are: Baden, Basel, Birsfelden, 
Grenchen, Lucerne, Naters, Olten, Rorschach, Thun, Vernier, Winterthur, Zurich and Zug. Online: 
http://www.klimabuendnis.org/download/satzung_2004_en.pdf. 
Incomindios is a NGO which takes care of the rights of indigenous people in the dialogue of the cultures, see Ziele 
von Incomindios. Online: http://www.incomindios.ch/portrait/portrait_ziele.html. 
CITTA: The case of Zurich    15
2.4 Economic promotion  
Taking a look at economic promotion activities before 1990, we can astonishingly only find two 
organisations, both privately financed, which had a clear focus on regional or national politics, 
but were hardly involved in promoting the city or the region of Zurich for foreign investments 
(see Kübler 2004: 183ff.). First, there is the Chamber of Commerce and industry (ZHK: Zürcher 
Handelskammer) that covers the cantons of Zurich, Zug and Schaffhausen. Founded in 1867, it is 
part of the national economic interest group economiesuisse and endeavours to promote local 
economic interests15. This mainly includes the defence of a liberal economic policy. The ZHK 
additionally provides their members with a range of services (e.g. a newsletter or a well-known 
arbitral tribunal). Currently about 1300 enterprises are members of the ZHK. Second, there is the 
Zurich’s cantonal commerce association (KGV: Kantonaler Gewerbeverband). Founded in 1854, 
it is an interest group for small and medium enterprises and tries to influence policies wherever it 
seems to be necessary for the current 13’000 members. This leads mainly to lobby activities on 
the local and cantonal level. The KGV is part of the Swiss commerce association (SGV: 
Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband) and is well known to launch initiatives and referenda to 
change local policies in the sense of their members’ interests. Both of these economic interest 
groups help local enterprises in practical matters and can be seen as interest groups for a liberal 
economic policy. They both do not try to promote the area of Zurich as an attractive location for 
foreign enterprises or investments. Activities concerning economic promotion only started after 
the rejection of the EEC-treaty in 1992, when several organisations on different levels started 
their activities in economic promotion.  
The first to react was the canton of Zurich which created the coordination-bureau for European 
and economic questions (Koordinationsstelle für Europa- und Wirtschaftsfragen). This special 
unit of the department of economic promotion of the canton was mainly concerned with 
answering questions from enterprises that wished to establish themselves in the canton of Zurich 
(Kübler 2004: 197). In 1996 the Koordinationsstelle changed its focus to a more active role, now 
focussing on the function as a marketing body for the canton of Zurich. It tried actively to attract 
foreign companies to settle in Zurich and promoted an international oriented information 
platform. The Koordinationsstelle also served as a coordinating body between the different 
involved actors in economic promotion (ZHK, KGV, but also the national economic promotion 
bureau). 
                                                 
15 Information can be found at http://www.zurichcci.ch. 
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In 1998 the Greater Zurich Area (GZA) was founded and took over all activities concerning 
economic promotion from the Koordinationsstelle für Europa- und Wirtschaftsfragen. In the 
new GZA public and private actors worked jointly together for the outward economic promotion 
of the Greater Zurich economic area16. Various communes, including the city of Zurich, three 
cantons (including Zurich) and different private enterprises are financing the activities of the 
GZA. The GZA widened its field of competence in contrast with the Koordinationsstelle, not 
only trying to attract them to  the area of Zurich but also by helping them with different practical 
problems like finding offices, getting working permissions etc. This lead to increased costs of 
roughly 3.4 million Euros per year (see Kübler 2004: 198). In 1997 there was another association 
founded, the Zürich Plus. In reaction to the promotion activities of the two bigger cities in the 
area (Zurich and Winterthur) this association was a form of cooperation between smaller 
communes and inter-communal associations to develop their own economic promotion activity. 
As more and more communes became members of the GZA and withdrew from Zürich Plus, the 
importance of the association Zürich Plus is steadily declining (see Kübler 2004: 200).  
The city of Zurich itself has a business development office, too17. This office, directly under the 
control of the mayor, tries actively to promote the establishment of new businesses in the city. It 
helps companies to establish their offices in Zurich and to liaise with public authorities. The 
office tries to reinforce the City of Zurich’s attractiveness as a European economic centre (self-
description). 
As a conclusion it can be seen that numerous associations are concerned with economic 
promotion in the area of Zurich. They reflect the strong competition between the Swiss 
communes but can also be seen as a reaction to the rejection of the EEC-defeat in 1992. As 
economic promotion was nearly inexistent before 1992, diverse various began to occupy the 
field of public marketing since then. 
2.5 Representing the city at the international level  
It is difficult to reconstruct activities of international representation of Zurich’s city government. 
Indeed, the government members do not have to account for their stays abroad unless there is a 
parliamentary request. As in the Swiss political system local government foresees one city 
government member for each department and the mayor is ‘only’ one of them, reflections on the 
international activities for Zurich should include not only the mayor’s activities but also the other 
government member’s activities. As the mayor of Zurich is responsible for representing Zurich 
                                                 
16 Information can be found at http://www.gza.ch. 
17 Information can be found at http://www.wirtschaftsfoerderung.stadt-zuerich.ch. 
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at the international level, the mayor or at least the mayor’s office makes most of international 
contacts. If we look at the city networks and partnerships (see above), it can be seen that most of 
the network activities are held on the departmental level, city government members did not 
participate in any conference of the examined networks. The only stays abroad from a city 
government member that could be found were in the city partnership with Kunming. Thomas 
Wagner (mayor on that date) went to Kunming in 1994 and city officials from various 
departments stayed for several weeks or even months in China throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
This lead, as mentioned, to heavy criticisms and these activities were stopped as soon as the 
partnership came under the control of the mayor’s office in 2001. The current mayor, Elmar 
Ledergerber went to Kunming in November 2004 to discuss the further development of the 
partnership and to declare the point of view that Zurich is trying to put a more economic 
orientation into the partnership. Elmar Ledergerber is said to take a more active role on the 
international level than his predecessor in office, Josef Estermann. In any case, it clearly is the 
mayor who is considered as the head-of-diplomacy when it comes to representing the city of 
Zurich to the outside world. 
2.6 Zurich’s international strategy: from social- to market-centred 
As the above-mentioned examples show, the city of Zurich followed a rather social-oriented 
international strategy before and at the beginning of the 1990s. Zurich was actively engaged in 
international ecological networks. It tried proactively to alter the drug debate on a European 
scale towards a more liberal way and was (also on the federal level) successful with it. The city 
partnership with Kunming was seen as a development project to help a poor Chinese city and 
economic promotion has been seen as something nice to have, but not really necessary. Suddenly 
throughout the 1990s the international strategy of the city of Zurich seemed to shift towards a 
more economic orientation. This can be seen within economic promotion, where diverse 
activities from different organisations took up action or intensified their work for attracting 
foreign investment. At the same time, previous engagements in international networks that dealt 
with social or ecological problems either ran out (as in the ECDP-case), were not renewed, or 
only played a subordinate role (as in the cases of METREX, ICLEI and the Climate Alliance). 
The clearest example for the change towards a more economic oriented policy seems to be the 
strategy followed by the city of Zurich within city networks. The originally development-
oriented partnership with Kunming came under heavy pressure to boost the more self-interested 
orientation of helping Zurich’s business community in getting a foot on the ground in the 
promising Chinese market. In the Kunming case, though, it looks as the partnership will come to 
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an end before benefits in this sense can materialise. The new partnership with San Francisco is 
clearly economic oriented and not supported with public money. The nowadays more economic 
orientation of Zurich’s international activities can also be seen in the strategy towards 
international events. Support form city government seems to be conditioned by expectations of 
economic gains. 
 
3. Explaining the change in the international strategy 
What were the reasons behind this change of the international strategy from a more social- to a 
more economic orientation? .In this chapter we try to isolate possible determining variables 
which help to explain this change. As a starting point we take the longstanding absence of 
Switzerland form the EU and especially from the European free market. Thereafter we draw our 
attention to the market conditions Zurich faces since the early 1990s and propose a connection 
between the absence from the European free market and the economic development of the 
Zurich area. Additionally to this - in our view - main explanatory causality we examine the 
influence of direct-democratic instruments and the intergovernmental relations between Zurich 
and its surrounding communes. 
3.1 A city outside the EU 
Switzerland, declaring itself as a neutral country, took this for a long time as reason not to join 
the European Union. Rather strong national feelings and the fear of loosing direct-democratic 
instruments made it clear, that joining the EU would have no chance in a popular vote. 
Nevertheless, the federal government and parliament, fearing economic losses from the staying 
apart of the European free market, proposed to join the European Economic Area (EEA) treaty. 
This lead to opposition from the right-wing SVP in the referendum against the EEA. Shortly 
before the vote on the EEA in 1992 took place, the federal government announced its wish to 
join the EU as a full member and deposited its application for admission in Brussels. The very 
close rejection (50.3%) of the EEA-treaty was partly explained by the awkward timing of the 
federal Swiss government’s application for EU-membership, as this led to a campaign against 
the EEA that was mainly based on arguments against the EU.  
After the defeat of the EEA-treaty, a painstaking process of negotiation between Switzerland and 
the EU on bilateral agreements began. In 2000, a clear majority of the Swiss electorate (67%) 
voted in favour of the first bilateral agreement. They finally entered into force on June 1st 2002, 
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as all the member states of the EU had to ratify the treaties. In the meantime the Swiss voted 
with a clear ¾-majority against an initiative to join the EU that was only supported by the social 
democrats.  
It became clear soon after the ‘Bilaterale I’ were entered into force that there were still numerous 
unsolved problems in the relation between Switzerland and the EU, so negotiations on the 
‘Bilaterale II’ began, which include - among other things - the treaties of Schengen and Dublin 
and the opening of the Swiss labour market for workers from the EU. Both will have to stand a 
popular vote in 2005 and the rejection of any of these would give the EU the right to withdraw 
from all bilateral agreements.  
So the relationship between the Switzerland and the EU remains rather unclear for the moment. 
Whether the bilateral agreements will allow the Swiss economy to fully participate in the 
European market will become clear within the near future. Up to now, because of the rejection of 
the EEA-treaty in 1992, the Swiss economy is facing problems due to the absence of the 
European market.  
3.2 Market conditions 
Looking at current indicators the market conditions for Zurich seem to be comfortable. Zurich is 
showing positive figures in international comparisons between cities or metropolitan areas 
concerning GDP, unemployment rate or added value per working hour (Zürcher Kantonalbank 
2000: 11). Taking a look at the number of global headquarters of top 1000 companies 
worldwide, seven of them are located in Zurich18. In Europe, this number is only exceeded by 
Paris, London and Munich. The economic area of Zurich is seen both as a motor for the whole 
Swiss economy and as the city which is linking the Swiss economy to the international market 
(Frey 2004: 5). One out of six jobs in Switzerland can be found in the agglomeration of Zurich 
(see table 1).  
Table 1: Civilian Labour Force in Zurich and the Agglomeration of Zurich 
  employees 2001 % of Switzerland 
agglomeration of Zurich 676 040 16.3 




                                                 
18 See Statistik.info 05/2000 of the canton of Zurich. 
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The local labour market relies heavily on white-collar jobs and has not undergone any ‘trauma of 
deindustrialization’ (Savitch/Kantor 2002: 58) in the last thirty years. Its current strength mainly 
flows from recent successes of the banking sector. Since the Second World War, Zurich became 
one of the leading European financial centres. It is not Switzerland’s capital city but its city of 
capital. It especially relies on insurance and banking which now make for 25% of Zurich’s GDP 
(Zürcher Kantonalbank 2000 18). Additionally Zurich became one of the leading stock markets 
in Europe. In the city of Zurich, only 13% of all jobs are located in blue-collar industries. In the 
agglomeration of Zurich, there are more jobs in the second sector (about 27%, see table 2).  
Table 2: Employees in the agglomeration of Zurich in the year 2001 
 Employees 2001   
Agglomeration 
of Zurich   
  Whole  City of  131 other  
  agglomeration Zurich communes 
Blue collar    
full time employees  116 178  37 025  79 153 
part time employees  17 756  5 928  11 828 
Together  133 934  42 953 (13%)  90 981 (27%) 
White collar    
full time employees  369 321  203 189  166 132 
part time employees  172 785  93 387  79 398 
Together  542 106  296 576 (87%)  245 530 (73%) 
All together  676 040   339 529 (100%)  336 511 (100%)
Source: http://www4.stzh.ch/ssz/dienstleistungen/stst/download/xls/stst_2003_30.xls  
 
Of course, its heavy dependence on the finance economy makes the labour market vulnerable to 
ups and downs of the international financial markets. All in all, the city lost 12% of jobs 
throughout the last 30 years and especially since the early 1990s, not only but also due to heavy 
crisis in financial markets (Zürcher Kantonalbank 2000: 45). Although living costs are high, the 
inhabitants of Zurich remain the ones with the greatest purchasing power in a world-wide 
comparison with other cities, mainly because of the high wages (in Switzerland in general, but 
especially for Zurich)19. 
Although these indicators all seem to state that Zurich’s market conditions are very favourable, 
some qualifications need to be added. Switzerland has had the weakest economic performance of 
all OECD-countries throughout the last fifteen years and is also ranked last in economic growth 
in Europe. The global market has led to a major challenge for the Swiss economy and there is a 
                                                 
19 Source: Union Bank of Switzerland, Prices and Earnings, A comparison of purchasing power around the globe / 
2003 edition; treatment realized by Horace. Can be found at  http://www.immigration-
quebec.gouv.qc.ca/vivrequebec/section2/2_1-an.htm 
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heavy debate going on if the slow growth of the Swiss economy is linked to the political 
isolation since the refusal of the European Economic Area treaty. Although the isolationist 
Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP tries to neglect the argument, most parties see the absence from 
the EU as a hurdle for further economic development. Liberal parties mention that the refusal of 
the EEC-treaty was “a great loss for economic liberalisation and thus for economic prosperity”20. 
Not having the chance to participate as an equal partner in the European market is seen as a 
major obstacle for the economic development of Switzerland in general but especially for 
Zurich. Indeed, its financial services heavily rely on the European market.  
These differences between absolute and relative figures appear clearly when focusing on some 
precise indicators. The unemployment rate within the city of Zurich nearly reached 7% in 1997 
and is nowadays around 5%. This figure is still very low comparing with other European cities 
but these numbers are considerably high for a region that was used to an unempoyment rate of 
less than 1% for decades. In an interesting investigation on the economy of Zurich, the Zürcher 
Kantonalbank (2000, 2004) found out that the economic growth of the Zurich region was mainly 
due to shifts within Switzerland in favour of Zurich and in disfavouring other Swiss areas. But, 
and this is especially interesting to mention, it has not been due to gaining a stronger position in 
the European market. As the Zurich economy is depending on the financial sector, which itself is 
highly globalised, this is seen as an indicator for rather “dark clouds” above the Zurich economy 
in the near future.  
The drift apart of a more and more global economy and a political isolation is seen as a major 
challenge to politics since 1991. The legislative of the canton of Zurich debated several times on 
the problem and stated, that the “Swiss lost their self-confidence on their economy” and that the 
time “when the region of Zurich was known for economic prosperity, growth and innovation has 
disappeared from our memories”21. In an interesting comparison of the biggest European cities, 
the European Cities Monitor report asks year after year since 1990 500 top businessmen, which 
cities are the best to locate business in Europe. In this comparison of 30 metropolitan areas 
Zurich ranked constantly 6th or 7th throughout the early 90s. In recent years, it lost ground and 
dropped to position 11th in 2003 (Cushman&Wakefield, Healey&Baker 2004: 5).  
                                                 
20 See www.europa.ch/bern/events/bs_ewrnein.html. 
21 Statements can be found at http://www.kantonsrat.zh.ch/dokumente/sitzungen/kr-protokolle/1995-1999/131.doc. 
Own translation. 
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So we conclude that the perception of the Zurich market conditions is mostly influenced by the 
lost terrain throughout the last 15 years and less by their still rather favourable economic 
performance in absolute terms.  
3.3  Intergovernmental relations 
Local government is traditionally very strong in Switzerland. And although central government 
gained some influence with respect to the local level in the past 30 years, communes are still 
seen to be at the heart of Swiss politics. This can be seen for instance with career ladders of 
politicians: There is usually no chance to gain a seat in a national parliament without having had 
a few years of experience in an elective office at the local or cantonal level. The accumulation of 
mandates is also possible, as Swiss national parliamentarians are not professionals. 
The Swiss political system has clear intentions of subsidiary and fiscal equivalence. Taxes are 
raised on the level where services are provided. In average, Swiss communes raise 70% of 
communal revenues by communal taxes (46%) and fees (24%)22. Only 18% of communal 
revenues stem from transfer payments made by higher state levels - the lowest proportion found 
among all Western European countries. For the city of Zurich, the part of transfer payments is 
slightly higher as it benefits from financial compensation for some of its centrality services: only 
roughly 32 percent23 of total spending of the city of Zurich was transfer payments from upper 
level governments.  
Hand in hand with this strong position of communes in Switzerland goes a therein inherent 
problem. The Swiss territorial structure is very stable, the number of communes is nearly 
constant since the 2nd world war and amalgamations have been very rare (Steiner 2002). The 
heavy political fragmentation of the Swiss agglomerations is a result of the principle requiring 
the consent of communes for territorial reforms (Kübler 2003: 9). This phenomenon can also be 
seen in the case of the agglomeration of Zurich, which consists of 133 communes that are spread 
over three cantons and even include some communes of the German Bundesland Baden-
Württemberg. The city of Zurich has around 365’000 inhabitants; the whole agglomeration has a 
total of 1.1 million inhabitants, so only 1/3 of the inhabitants of the whole agglomeration live in 
the city itself.  
There is no governing body for the agglomeration of Zurich, as in the Swiss political system, 
each commune has the same rights and duties and Swiss federalism makes no differentiation 
                                                 
22 Numbers for 1997. 
23 This is only a very rough estimation as the Swiss law on rearrangements (Finanzausgleich) between federal levels 
is very complex. Quelle: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Zürich 2004: 385, own calculations. 
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between big cities and small communes. The communes around the city of Zurich are in strong 
competition with each other mainly trying to attract inhabitants and capital with low taxes, which 
makes cooperation between them rather difficult. However, purpose-oriented cooperation 
between communes is very frequent, but mainly limited to areas and services where clear 
economies of scale are presumable (Kübler 2003: 23). 
Because of the relative smallness of the city in comparison to the communes of the 
agglomeration, the canton of Zurich is politically dominated by the Hinterland. Only 50 out of 
180 members of the cantonal parliament and two out of seven executive members are from the 
city, which helps explain the city’s weak bargaining position against the communes of the 
agglomeration and against the canton. 
Additionally, as Switzerland is not a member of the EU, there is no direct interplay and no 
financial streams between the EU and the city of Zurich. There are bilateral agreements between 
the EU and Switzerland but they mainly focus on economic cooperation and do not include any 
financial contributions from the EU to Switzerland (or to the city of Zurich) but may lead to 
heavier economic competition by opening the Swiss market for European companies (see market 
conditions). 
The highly fragmented political system leads to heavy competition between the city of Zurich 
and the agglomeration communes. Concerning the international activities there is no cooperation 
between the city and the surrounding communes, except in the case of economic promotion. The 
missing feeling of belonging to the same metropolitan area leaves the city alone in the 
international competition, not being able to rely on consent action or financial contribution to the 
international acitivites by other communes. 
3.4 Popular control 
The Swiss political system gives individuals the possibility not only to vote for their 
representatives in communal, cantonal or federal parliaments and governments but also to vote 
on specific issues through initiatives and referenda. This leads to an active participation of 
inhabitants in the political process. Participation rates on local initiatives and referenda usually 
vary between 30% and 60% and take place two to four times a year.  
In the last election of the Zurich city council and city government, 46% of the registered voters 
participated in the election. The 125 members of the city council are elected in twelve 
neighbourhood districts, which give neighbourhoods in elections some importance.  
CITTA: The case of Zurich    24
The city government is composed of nine directly elected members, including the mayor who is 
also chosen directly by the electorate. This results in a multi-party government, according to the 
Swiss system of consensus democracy (Lijphart 1984). Decisions within the city government are 
taken by the single majority of the nine members. The mayor formally has the role of a ‘primus 
inter pares’ but de facto has a clear leadership role within the city, although the sources of 
mayoral leadership are mainly symbolic rather than formal (Kübler 2003: 11).  
Due to the direct election of all nine government members and the resulting multi-party 
government, no dramatic changes in the city government’s party structure (like a change from 
right-wing to left-wing coalition) have occurred in the past. If we have a look at past mayors of 
the city, we can see that since 1990 both mayors were Social-democrats. Between 1982 and 
1990, it was in the hand of the liberal right wing party FDP. Within the city government, left-
wing parties hold a steady majority since 1933 of at least five seats with a short break between 
1982 and 1990 (see Kübler 2004: 181). So with the exception of an eight years term of a right 
wing city mayor with a right-wing majority within city government, city government has been 
dominated by the political left.  
Table 3: City mayors in the past decades 
  mayor of Zurich party 
1966-1982 Sigmund Widmer LDU (left-centre)
1982-1990 Thomas Wagner FDP (liberals) 
1990-2002 Josef Estermann SPS (socialists)
since 2002 Elmar Ledergerber SPS 
Source: http://www4.stzh.ch/ssz/dienstleistungen/publikationen/download/xls/D_02_2002.xls  
In spite of the left majority, the government’s power is significantly limited by the extensive 
direct democratic institutions, giving the electorate frequent occasions to vote on singular issues. 
Direct-democratic instruments have a long-standing tradition in Switzerland and have not 
undergone any major changes in the last decades. In general, it has been shown that they tend to 
favour the status-quo and thereby have a structurally conservative effect (Papadopoulos 1998). 
Hence, although civic groups and labour unions play a weak role, the direct democratic 
institutions make for strong popular control in all significant aspects of city politics. 
Concerning the international activities, popular control has been in favour of a more 
postmaterialistic orientation as the Kunming project was supported and big international events 
were under pressure from public opinion. So we can conclude that the change from a 
postmaterialistc to a rather materialistic orientation has been primarily initiated by city 
government and popular control seems to set an pole against this development where it can.  
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4. Conclusion  
Reviewing the four presented aspects to determine a city’s strategy in the international 
marketplace it should have become clear that the city of Zurich has a longstanding tradition of 
social-oriented public policy. A strong engagement in networks with social or ecological agendas 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, relatively restrictive zoning law, a more or less inexistent 
economic promotion of the workplace Zurich and a not visible strategy in the city’s 
representation to foreign countries go along with excellent economic indicators until 1992. 
Zurich followed a strong postmaterialistic strategy allowed by strong economic performance.  
The situation changed with the popular vote against joining the European Economic Area treaty 
in 1992. As a result, materialistic issues became more and more important to the political leaders 
of the city as the fear of loosing economic power in comparison to other cities in Europe was 
inherent. Even though Zurich seems to have a strong position now in absolute economic figures, 
it is loosing more and more strength. Relative figures show that other European cities are doing 
dramatically better than Zurich. This relative loss over time seems relevant to explain the shift in 
the international strategy of Zurich which contains more and more elements of a materialistic 
orientation not under-stressing the long-standing postmaterialistic orientation. There are 
numerous indications for the more materialistic orientation: big projects are favoured by the city 
government only when they might include economic gains (like in the case of the Hardturm 
stadium), the rather risky project of hosting Olympic winter games was though not supported. 
The city partnership with Kunming has undergone the same value change, coming from a clear 
help orientation to a foreseen chance for economic promotion. The partnership will most likely 
end because these economic gains could not be realised. Instead the new initiative with San 
Francisco has a clear economic background. Looking at city networks the same applies, all social 
or environmental oriented networks have either come to an end or taken actions in the shadows 
of politics. No new network activity could be identified.  
This all leads to the conclusion that the city of Zurich has been wakened up by the vote against 
the EEA in 1992 and tries to retain an economic leader position within Switzerland, but also on 
European grounds by a more and more economic-oriented international strategy. 
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